




Logical form has semantic import.
Logical sentences (GG: Greeks are
Greeks) and their synonym intercep-
tions (GH: Greeks are Hellenes) state
the same fact but different truths with
different explanations. Terms retain
objectual reference but its role in ex-
plaining truth is preempted by syntax
or synonymy.  Church’s Test exposes
puzzles.  QMi sentences (GmG:
‘Greeks’ means Greeks), and QTi
sentences (p≡it is true that p≡“p” is
true) are metalogical necessities,
true by syntax. Their interceptions
alter syntax and modality, yielding
contingent truths (GmH: ‘Greeks’
means Hellenes, HmG: ‘Hellenes’
means Greeks). Meta-logical transla-
t ion preserves syntax (GmG:
‘Greichen’ bedeutet Greichen), not
necessari ly objectual reference.
Metalogical syntax secures truth by
self-referential quotational index-
ing that identifies quotational refer-
ent with an intrasentential replica.
I. INTERCEPTION NONSYNONYMY
T he Synonym Substitution Principle says that synonymous wordsreplace each other in a sentence without affecting its meaning.
The Principle must be right about most instances, but what of the unique
case of intercepting: nonuniform substituting of a term pivotal in the




GG: Greeks are Greeks
GH: Greeks are Hellenes
And, if the meaning of a name is its reference, are gg and gh synonymous:
gg: Greece is Greece
gh: Greece is Hellas?2
Hilary Putnam’s [1981] assertion of the synonymy of interceptions is
clear and succinct:
. . . the interchangeability of ‘bachelor’ and ‘male adult human being who
has never been married’. . . explains why ‘all bachelors are unmarried’ may
be regarded as synonymous with ‘all male adult humans who have never
been married are unmarried’. . . the truth of the latter statement . . .
is . .  . presupposed.3
This assumption of interception synonymy has shaped Analytical thought
since Locke trashed as trifling the essential truths ancient genius was
after. For the central, startling thesis of his Essay, that definitional truths
are trivial self-identities, Locke is the Kepler of Kant’s Copernican revo-
lution.4 Puzzles of interception synonymy trigger Frege’s ‘Sinn und
Bedeutung’, and plague Linguistic Philosophy in paradoxes of analysis
and mystifying, multipurpose arguments like Moore’s open question,
Gödel’s slingshot, and Church’s Translation Test.
Interception synonymy is well nigh never doubted,5 and obviously
mythical. Putnam [1954] himself, a quarter century prior, pronounced
the plain fact of our sense of our own speech: ‘“All Greeks are Greeks”
and “All Greeks are Hellenes” do not feel quite like synonyms’.6
The explanation of this linguistic intuition is near plain as the
datum. Pairs like GG-GH do not sound alike because they are not used
alike. They are not freely interchangeable because they do not say or
mean the same. Synomic interceptions are most naturally used to ex-
plain the meaning of their own terms, in place of QM sentences, like:
GmH7: ‘Greeks’ means Hellenes
and QMQ sentences, like:
GmH: ‘Greeks’ means what ‘Hellenes’ means.
We do not use GH to say what we say with GmG or GmG.
GmG: ‘Greeks’ means Greeks
GmG: What ‘Greeks’ means is what ‘Greeks’ means.
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And we cannot use GG to say what we use GmH or GmH to say. Nor do we
standardly use GG where we use GmG and GmG.
Yet, without a drop of empirical data to fuel it, despite all our ex-
perience of language, empiricism plausibly proceeds on the premise
of interception synonymy. Synomic interceptions flat out fail every test
of sameness of meaning that motivates translators, lexicographers, and
linguists, all but the one criterion logicians have cared about: their fac-
tual content is identical. The same objects are denoted, the same properties
predicated, the same extrasentential, multiexpressible reality asserted.
Whatever may be GG’s factual content, whatever it says objectually, about
the multiexpressible world of fact outside itself, is just what all its transla-
tions, like:
GG8: Griechen sind Griechen
say, and what all of all their synomic interceptions objectually say. Their
“truth conditions” are identical. Elsewhere, (cognitive, informational)
synonymy, sameness of semantic content is sameness of factual content.
Why should it—how could it—be otherwise with truths due to syntax
and truths due to semantics? GH’s (cognitive) meaning cannot differ
from GG/GG’s unless GH somehow implies some fact not implied by
the fact it states. What could that be?
II. HISTORY
Putnam [1954] provided the first lines of an argument for interception
nonsynonymy from elemental principles of linguistic theory relating
syntax to semantics. Simply stated: syntax determines sentence mean-
ing apart from word meanings, and interceptions lack the truth securing
syntax of logical sentences, so interceptions cannot say what their logical
correlates say.
Putnam [1954] was prompted by Mates’ noticing nonequivalence
in synomic interceptions of belief reports.9 Putnam’s Postulate, that logi-
cal form has semantic content, has been cited repeatedly, often obliquely,
rarely approvingly, and more rarely with any of all that cries out for clarifica-
tion. From Church’s10 and Sellars’11 replies onward, analysis gets skewed by
staring at intensional context subbings.12 Putnam’s Postulate is about logi-
cal syntax per se. Its implications for intensionality conundra are
confirmational corollaries of its claim about elemental, referentially trans-
parent, extensional logical truth. Church, Sellars, all critics sail by the
syntactic iceberg while ridiculing its tips on intensionality with assump-
tions of intuitive semantics.13
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This sorry tale’s saddest chapter is the abandonment of Putnam’s
brainchild by its begetter. Instead of criticizing its critics, we see him
renouncing it in assorted, often celebrated assertions.14 Putnam is as acute
as they come, and blessedly unabashed about changing his mind now and
again, but he has seemed obliviously silent about his ambivalence over
interception synonymy.
Putnam has shown us the unsettled condition we are all in when we
leave unresolved this antinomy at the center of synonymy. Interception
nonsynonymy is an empirical certainty. It is also a necessity entailed by
Putnam’s Postulate, an a priori certainty for those who fully understand
what it says. But it bangs into all that beckons us to think of semantic con-
tent as factual content, and to feel certain that interception nonsynonymy
is a priori impossible. This collision of hardpan principles lies at the nexus
of our conceptions of meaning and logic. We are bound to flounder until
we find some understanding of the why, what, and how of interception
nonsynonymy.
III. SYNONYMY VERSUS ANALYSIS
Defenses of interception synonymy derive mainly from Church’s Transla-
tion Test of semantic equivalence.15 The Test presumes that translation
preserves meaning, so sentences are inequivalent if their translations are.
Churchian translations are essentially synonym substitutions. A translating
sentence is to retain the original syntax, and alter only morphemically by
synonym subbing.
The Test rests on the Principle so it cannot supply support. Worse,
the Principle evidently entails the Test’s futility. Any disparity apparent
only under translation, not in the original, should be a discrepancy in and
of the translation. Where the Principle applies, translating should test
only our patience.16
Translations are not analyses. Churchian translating brings bilinguals
no enlightenment. Analyses can be revelations, a fact smacking little of
paradox absent any mistaking of synonymy for analysis.
Locke recognized that analyses are not synonymies.17 He would not
waste pages to prove GH and its ilk ‘trifling’. Alas, Locke led legions to say:
Essentialist analyses are trifles because our name for a property, the
analyzandum, is just an abbreviation of the analyzans. Actually, abbrevia-
tion paradigms, like:
ET: An ETA is an estimated time of arrival,
are trifling because they are synomic truths, not essentialist analyses.
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Analyses, like Locke’s ‘Lead is a metal’, are transnotational truths,
fully translatable, (apparently) necessary truths, knowable a priori. Synomic
truths (GH, gh, ET) express internotational relations, consequences of
contingent notational equivalences, knowable only a posteriori. They are
materially, morphemically specific, inexpressible without reusing some
pivotal term (or etymological cognate).18
‘Bachelor’ and its abbreviation ‘B’ predicate a property without de-
scribing it. Putnam’s [1981] analysans, ‘male adult human being who has
never been married’, describes the property; it states the property’s essen-
tial features. There can be no question whether ‘bachelor’ correctly
describes the property ‘B’ predicates. Whether Putnam’s analysans cor-
rectly describes the property ‘bachelor’ predicates can, logically,
grammatically, be a question, be put in question.19
IV. COMPOSITION VERSUS PROOF
Interception nonsynonymy can seem incredible by seeming incompatible
with the ‘compositionality’ of sentence meaning.20 That appearance may
evidence only an obtuseness about the semantic import of a distinctive
syntactic component of logical sentences.21
Putnam’s [1981] compositional picture says a synomic intercep-
tion is the resultant of intercepting, that it presupposes a logical truth.
Yet, elsewhere no natural sense attaches to a claim that a sentence
(‘Socrates is a Greek’) is a resultant of or presupposes some synony-
mous sentence (‘Socrates is an Hellene’). GH’s syntax is that of:
GM: Greeks are mortal
GP: Greeks are philosophers.
Linguistic theories do not suggest that the meaning of such empirical
claims is a resultant of intercepting a presupposed GG, so why suppose
it of GH? Formally, we could as well regard GG a substitution resultant
presupposing GH or GM or GP.
Referential and predicational self-identities (b=b, (x)(Fx Fx)) are
axiomatic in formal systems of proof. This does not entail their being
cognitive or conceptual primitives. Cognitive processing of meaning
probably proceeds by reverse interception, from interceptions to logi-
cal sentences. Toddlers are not taught self - identities before
pronouncings of alter-identities (b=c, (x)(Fx Gx)). How could they
be? That would be like imparting understanding of multiplication and
division by first explaining multiplying and dividing by 1.
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Synomic sentences may look like resultants of intercepting logical
sentences because synomic interceptions of complex logical sentences
are provable only by proving the logical truth and then intercepting it. Our
reasoning must run on the rails of logical syntax, and then jump the rail, by
synonym subbing, to another syntactic track. This order of proof is epistemic,
not ontic, semantic, alethic, or compositional. Only our knowledge of the
conclusion is explained by the reasoning. Its meaning and truth need
something more.
The atomic, two-termed GH is no more proven by intercepting
GG than reverse intercepting GH proves atomic GG. Such syntactically
basic synomic and logical truths are logically independent. If synonymy
does not explain GH’s necessity directly, without intercepting GG, the
interception would be an unwarrantable inference.22
V. TERM RECURRENCE
A logical sentence and its interceptions are syntactically divergent
completions of a shared syntactic frame.23 Completing the frame:
Greeks are
with ‘Greeks’ yields GG, a structure syntactically unlike any other clo-
sure of that open sentence. GM, GP and GH differ in meaning just because
‘mortals’, ‘philosophers’, and ‘Hellenes’ do. The GH-GG nonsynonymy is
not explainable by the meanings of ‘Hellenes’ and ‘Greeks are ’ ver-
sus the meanings of ‘Greeks’ and ‘Greeks are ’,      for there is no
difference there.
The terms of logical and synomic sentences objectually designate
and predicate as elsewhere. Otherwise, they could not be premises con-
necting synthetic predications: GH and HM (‘Hellenes are mortal’)
could not be major and minor premises for GM. GG’s factual content is
constructed from the same open sentence and term meanings as GH.
The nonsynonymy of GG-GH is in the syntax of term recurrence and
its absence.
Logic texts teach that no conclusion is validly deduced unless its
pivotal terms appear in its premise(s). That is because term (and sen-
tence) recurrence is the sole strictly syntactic device securing sameness
of sense and denotation in a sentence or sentence sequence. Any
other device is an extrasyntactic, semantic convention peculiar to
the notation.24 This requirement for logical validity, the syntactic truth
of a conditional, is a requirement for syntactic truths formed from any
connective, and for syntactic truth as such.
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Logical form is unique even among other truths often called formal.
Putnam [1954] ‘put aside as irrelevant’ the Synonym Substitution
Principle’s ‘formal similarity to the “equals may be substituted for
equals”’ of mathematics. Actually, the formal dissimilarity is key to in-
terception nonsynonymy. Mathematical truth is not syntactic. Uniform
subbing of nonsynonyms endangers mathematical truth. Meanwhile,
synonym subbings like ‘14-6=2+6’ and ‘14-6=2+IV’ are synonymous.
Term recurrence is essential for syntactic truth, and irrelevant to math-
ematical truth.25
VI. MEANING AS EXPLANATION
Logical truths survive all uniform term substitutions. Their term refer-
ences and predications, though objectual, are idle. The role of term sense
and denotation—and thus the role of the world—in the explanation of
truth is preempted by term recurrence in logical sentences. In synomic
truths, the explanatory role of extrasentential reality is preempted by the
coincident meaning of disparate terms.
GM’s meaning is identifiable with its factual content because its syn-
tax and word meanings fix only the factual condition GM states, without
fixing whether GM states a fact. GM’s truth is explained by the
multiexpressible, extrasentential reality that Greeks are mortal.
The necessity in GG and GH is explained by the construction of their
factual content, not by an extrasentential reality. A necessity is a truth in all
worlds. More than that, a truth’s necessity is an explanation of its being a
truth in all worlds. GG’s logical necessity is in its multirealizable,
translanguage structure. GH’s necessity is lexical, an artifact of GmH/
GmH’s truth, the QM/QMQ contingency explaining GH.
GH does not state GmH. GmH does not state or describe GH’s
factual content. GmH states the fact of synonymy that explains GH’s fac-
tual content, what it is and why GH has it, and why GH is necessary. So
too, gh is necessitated solely by the coreference of its names, not a bit
by the referent’s extrasentential features. GH is misunderstood without
some understanding of the vacuity of its factual content. You do not get
what GH says, you cannot construct or explain its content, without some
sensing that its truth is all a matter of word meanings, of alternative terms
for the same property. So GH’s meaning is expressible and identifiable
as GmH.
GG’s meaning is not expressed by GmG or anything like a lexical
definition. Its term’s meaning only specifies the objectual referent of
GG’s factual content, which distinguishes GG from nonsynonymous
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self-identities, like gg. The semantic import of GG’s term recurrence is in
the irrelevance of its term’s meaning to its necessity.
Objectually, GG is no more about its syntax than GH is about its terms.
Sentences having logical form, like GG and:
H: If she is a fretter and fretters are foolish, she is foolish
are not sentences about logical form, like:
A: The conjunction of her being a fretter and fretters’ being foolish implies
that she is foolish.
A is true, not by its own syntax, but because, through its terms’ mean-
ings, it says that sentences having H’s form are ipso facto true.26
H expresses the form it exhibits, but not by meaning A as GH means
GmH. Logical form is not semantic or representational in the sense of
referring to or meaning something outside the enformed sentence. Un-
like GH’s semantic relations, GG’s and H’s truth securing structures are
displayed, embodied in duplications within the sentential matter. Logical
form shows itself. It does not say itself or something else. Term recurrence
is an intrasentential relation with intrasentential import.
We do not understand a complex logical sentence, or any logical
sentence, until we realize it is one, and not a synthetic predication.
You categorially misconstrue what it says, you cannot construct its con-
tent, without some recognition (however dim) that its truth is fixed by
syntax. That explanation is ‘in’ a logical sentence’s meaning. When we
listen to GG and H as sentences of logic, when we hear their vacuity, we
hear their symbols capturing certainty by their sameness instead of
their content.27
Sentence meaning fixes factual content, and thereby method of
verification. Synthetic predications are justified, not by features of the
expressional matter, but by extrasentential facts, cognized by percep-
tion, ratiocination, divine revelation, or whatever. Truth explained by
abstract, translanguage syntax is cognizable a priori. Synomic truth is
uncognizable and incomprehensible without a posteriori cognition of
semantic contingencies. Interception realigns inferential relations with
all other sentences.
VII. METALOGICAL TRANSLATION
Church’s Test has been a bulwark of interception synonymy by assuming it.
The Test turns on translating metalogical QMi sentences with synomic
interceptions, extralogical (non-QMi) QM sentences:
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QM : ExmEy: ‘Ex’ means (says, designates, etc.) Ey
28
QMi: ExmEx: ‘Ex’ means Ex.
The Test says BmB intertranslates BmB, whereas BmB intertranslates
BmB.
B: Blood is red
B: Blut ist rot
BmB: ‘Blood is red’ says that blood is red
BmB: ‘Blood is red’ heißt daß Blut ist rot
BmB: ‘Blut ist rot’ heißt daß Blut ist rot
BmB: ‘Blut ist rot’ says that blood is red.
The core argument is compelling. All four QM sentences predicate the
same property, saying that blood is red. BmB and BmB predicate it of sen-
tence B; BmB and BmB predicate it of B. BmB–BmB and BmB–BmB are
the only pairs sharing factual content, so they are the only synonyms. And
since the mixed language sentences express empirical contingencies, their
QMi synonyms must too. Q.E.D.
VIII. EXPLAINING TEST RESULTS
That reasoning commands respect, but not assent. What is at work is no
quirk of subbing intraquotationally (which Church deems the
Principle’s sole exception). That misplaces the muddle. Notwithstand-
ing any factual content switch, all four QM sentences are mutual semantic
entailments, interderivable by synonym subbing, either intra- or
extraquotational.29 All four substitutional possibilities transmit truth.
More generally, all synomic interceptions of a QMi sentence or its QMi
translations are extralogical QM sentences entailing each other by con-
tingent semantic facts.30
Meanwhile, whether substitution is intraquotation (BmB–BmB;
BmB–BmB), affecting factual content, or extraquotation (BmB–BmB;
BmB–BmB) maintaining factual content, synomic intercepting trans-
forms a QMi tautology into a QM report of a notational accident. In
object level intercepting (GG–GH), term synonymy is a surrogate for
syntax, securing necessary coextension. Through metalogical intercept-
ing (GmG–GmH), synonym subbing leads from a logical necessity to a
semantic contingency that explains a lexical necessity (GH).
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If GH’s semantic content were the translanguage factual content of
GG and GH, GH could not mean (say, imply) GmH. Actually, while the
first two of the following are blatantly false, if the third be false it is not
blatantly so.
GHm(GmG): ‘Greeks are Hellenes’ says/means ‘Greeks’ means Greeks
GGm(GmH): ‘Greeks are Greeks’ says/means ‘Greeks’ means Hellenes
GHm(GmH): ‘Greeks are Hellenes’ says/means ‘Greeks’ means Hellenes.
None but pedants protests the last. More to the point and less tenden-
tious, intercepting QMi sentences about logical sentences transforms a
logical necessity (GGmGG) into a logical impossibility (GGmGH,
HGmGG):
GGmGG: ‘Greeks are Greeks’ means Greeks are Greeks
GGmGH: ‘Greeks are Greeks’ means Greeks are Hellenes
HGmGG: ‘Hellenes are Greeks’ means Greeks are Greeks.
As a matter of logic, interceptions cannot match the meaning of logical
truths.
Consequently, synomic intercepting in intensional contexts may turn
a certainty like:
Church would qualmlessly tell children that the necessity of Greeks being
Greeks is a matter of pure logic alone
into a dubiety:
Church would qualmlessly tell children that the necessity of Greeks being
Hellenes is a matter of pure logic alone.
Synonymies are contingencies, and so is knowledge of them, so their de-
nial is not illogical or irrational. Thus the inequivalence of:
EGM: Ed affirms (says or thinks) that Greeks are mortal
EHM: Ed affirms that Hellenes are mortal.
While interchangeable as statements of the factual content Ed af-
f i rms ,  EGM and EHM ascr ibe  to  Ed log ica l l y  independent
understandings of the fact he affirms, with differing explanatory and
predictive import for Ed’s behavior. Inferences between EGM and




Churchian arguments for interception synonymy presuppose and cannot
prove the insignificance of term recurrence in logic. They avoid question
begging by arguing ad absurdum, exposing paradoxical implications of
interception nonsynonymy and defying us to make sense of apparent
impossibilities.
 For example, it seems impossible for GmG to be logically neces-
sary, since, certainly, GmG and GmH have identical factual content, and
GmH states an empirical contingency. Also, certainly, the logically nec-
essary self-identity GmG and contingent GmH predicate logically
independent properties of logically independent objects. How could
they be mutually entailing?
These challenges are formidable, but paradoxical platitudes popu-
lating this region need not be parented by interception nonsynonymy.
Surely, the contingency, GmH, explains the necessity of GH. But how, when,
surely, Greeks would be Hellenes (GH would be true) even if our words
‘Greeks’ and ‘Hellenes’ had never existed (GmH had been false)?
X. METALOGIC OF TRUTH
Let us start with the Church Test’s attack on the metalogical principle,
QTi, and instances, like Bti:
QTi: p ≡ it is true that p ≡ ‘p’ is true
QTi: p ≡ pt ≡ pt
Bti: B ≡ Bt ≡ Bt
Bt: It is true that blood is red
Bt: ‘Blood is red’ is true.
B and Bt are mutually entailing. They intertranslate B and Bt:
Bt: Dass Blut ist rot ist wahr.
Bt–Bt state one fact; Bt–Bt state another:
Bt: ‘Blood is red’ ist wahr
Bt: ‘Blut ist rot’ ist wahr
Bt: ‘Blut ist rot’ is true.
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The two facts are logically independent. Bt’s synonym, Bt, has no logical
entailment with B or Bt. So Bt has none. Q.E.D.
This assumes interception synonymy: viz., since Bt translates Bt in
extralogical contexts, it does so when Bt is a pivotal component of a logical
truth like Bti, where such translation is synomic intercepting.31
XI. LOGICAL TRUTH OF QMI
QTi gets rejected as a metalogical principle partially defining truth, be-
cause QTi is a corollary of QMi (and p ≡ pt), and the Test rejects QMi as a
metalogical principle partially defining meaning. Churchians say that, to
license enquotation and disquotation between Bt and Bt, a contingent
BmB must be premised, like:
BemB: (The English sentence) ‘Blood is red’ says blood is red.32
However, the reasoning requiring that premise then calls for another:
(BemB)em(BemB): ‘Blood is red’ (in English) says blood is red (in English)
says ‘Blood is red’ (in English) says blood is red
which calls for:
[(BemB) em (BemB)]em[(BemB)em(BemB)],
and so on. Denying QMi’s logical character misconceives its inferential
role in the way Lewis Carroll explained with the object level modus ponens.
MP and QMT
MP: p&(p q) q
QMT: pmp ≡ (pt ≡ pt)
are inference schemata whose instantiations state valid inferences, since
these conditionals are true whatever their component sentences mean.
XII. INTRASENTENTIAL INDEXING
Church rejected QMi as a schema of logic comparable to ‘p p’, ‘x=x’,
‘(x)(Fx ≡ Fx)’. He assumed the referent for the BmB quotation is indexed
by some explicit or implicit qualifier like: ‘the English sentence’.33
So construed, BmB and Bti are extralogical, for truth is not secured
syntactically. Syntax secures metalogical truth only if some self-referen-




[itlotu]: in the language of this utterance.
Translation must transmit the structure that makes a sentence (meta)-
logical. Other sentences can contain self-referenced quotations; metalogical
truths must.
Intrasentential indexing enforces intraquotation translation (BmB–
BmB). Metalogical translation replicates, not the original enquoted matter,
but the self-referenced intrasentential twin, because metalogical truth is
necessitated by intrasentential relations, not by an extrasentential referent.
XIII. METALOGICAL SUBJECTS
Metalogical sentences may be about either an expression or the
multiexpressible content expressed, a meaning or proposition. In:
Bpt: The proposition, ‘Blood is red’, is true
the indexer, ‘proposition’, demands intraquotation translation (Bt–Bt) to
secure both objectual reference to content and metalogical syntax. Quota-
tion replication (Bt–Bt) forces reference to the matter and eliminates
metalogical syntax in translations of Bti.34 Similarly, the referent subject of:
GmG: The meaning of ‘Greeks’ is Greeks
is also the meaning of ‘Griechen’, so GmG shares metalogical syntax and
factual content with:
GmG: Der Sinn von ‘Griechen’ ist Griechen.
Metalogical truths about meanings and propositions are fully multi-
expressible because their subjects are.
Metalogic about matter is another matter. When reading Bt as:
Bst: The sentence, ‘Blood is red’, is true,
translating the tripartite equivalence Bsti as Bsti sacrifices objectual ref-
erence to save metalogical syntax. Metalogical content construction
identifies quotational referents intrasententially. Bsti and Bsti intertranslate
since both assert that:
Blood is red ≡ it is true that blood is red ≡ the sentence in this utterance
that says blood is red is true.
Non-self-referential identifications of the referent sentence by its prop-
erties outside Bti are irrelevant to Bti’s metalogical necessity.
Similarly, objectual factual content shifts between:
GmG: (Our word) ‘Greeks’ means Greeks
GmG: (Unser Wort) ‘Griechen’ bedeutet Griechen,
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when each sentence describes an expression (attributes to a word a seman-
tic property: meaning Greeks), instead of identifying what is expressed.
Matter-referring QMi sentences are tautologous, since quotational refer-
ent identification is controlled intrasententially. GmG and GmG state a
single metalogical truth:
‘The word in this utterance that means Greeks’ means Greeks.
XIV. IDENTIFYING METALOGICAL FACT
Church takes BmB to be BemB, a contingency about matter translated by
BemB. His non-self-referential empirical contingencies are synomic inter-
ceptions of BmB indexed [itlotu]. All three sentences predicate the same
semantic property of the same matter. Logical necessity lies not in the fact,
but in the form the fact is cast in.
Necessarily, I speak the language I speak. As it happens, I am speak-
ing English, but whether I am or believe I am is immaterial. In any case, if
I say ‘Blood is red’ to say blood is red, my utterance, ‘Blood is red’, says
blood is red. I may thereby express a belief that blood is red. Whether I
hold that belief is immaterial. In any case, I express my incorrigible QMi
belief that my utterance, ‘Blood is red’ [itlotu], says blood is red. Whoever
says ‘p’ to say p rightly says ‘p’ says p, because whoever says ‘p’ to say p says
‘p’ says p. If the meaning of my ‘Blood is red’ [itlotu] is the meaning of that
expression in your idiolect, or in standard English, or the meaning of ‘Blut
ist rot’ in German, then my BmB mutually entails BemB and BemB, in the
sense that my seeing Greece mutually entails my visually perceiving Hellas.
XV. MODAL RELATIVISM
Synthetic truths correspond one-one with facts. Synomic interception
sentences with different terms can state the same fact but not the same
truth. Intertranslating matter-referring metalogical sentences with dif-
ferent terms, like Bsti and Bsti, state a single truth but distinct facts with
distinct objectual referents. How? Why?
A truth that p states a fact that p, but truths and facts individuate
separately. Truths are true statements (assertions, judgments), statements
of fact. A statement is in some language and may be translatable into oth-
ers. Facts are what is stated, not the statement of them. They are not in a
language; they are the multiexpressible, extrasentential reality asserted,
not a translatable thing.
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Concepts of a proposition fluctuate between factual and semantic
content. If propositional content is factual content, then GG, GG, GH,
and GG express one proposition. If propositional content is semantic,
individuated by intertranslation, not truth conditional equivalence, then
GG–GG state one proposition, GH states another, and GG a third. These
four sentences, two synonymous, are three nonsynonymous truths stating
one fact, with separate explanations of each truth and their common fact.
That transnotational, language-neutral fact is the objectual correlate of the
truths asserting it, an objectual reality explaining nothing.
Logical and metalogical truths are true whatever their terms mean.
Syntax explains their necessity. A fact of synonymy explains interception
necessity. The specific terms determine the subject, not the necessity,
of both logical truths and interceptions. In QMi and QTi, the subject-
specifying role of term meaning is preempted by the intrasentential
identification of the referent. Metalogical reference is set by syntax, what-
ever the enquoted and its replica happen to mean. GmG and GmG specify
a single, determinate self-referential truth: that the word in the sentence
that means Greeks means Greeks. As with GG–GG, the material difference
of GmG and GmG’s terms is extraneous to the explanation of the sen-
tences’ truth; so, the material difference in the objectual referents of
GmG–GmG is immaterial to the truth. Yet, that difference of referents is
an objectual reality, a difference in the objectual fact asserted.
The necessities of matter’s semantic properties (meaning, truth) are
explained by and are relative to that matter’s syntactic relations within its
QMi and QTi sentences. Otherwise Church’s Test will make a mess of
modality. It says that • p (Necessarily, p) and • pt (Necessarily, it is true
that p) mutually entail each other but not • pt (Necessarily, ‘p’ is true).
Whatever the ‘p’, • pt tests false when its quotation indexer imports an
empirical touch that transforms a princely necessity into a contingent frog.
If QMi, and thus QTi, sentences are extralogical, then all necessities (logi-
cal, lexical, mathematical, etc.) suffer the same degradation. Without some
reading wherein • pt mutually entails • p and pt, little sense is left in any
modal sentence. Like truth, necessity and possibility attach to a proposi-
tion only by attaching to an expression of it, by (and with) which it is
identifiable.
XV. MODAL MUDDLES
The syntactic duality of definite descriptions dissolves much of the murk




QMQ sentences can be cast in the familiar form for identities, Term is
Term :
GmH: The meaning of ‘Greeks’ is the meaning of ‘Hellenes’
gmh: What ‘Greece’ means is what ‘Hellas’ means.
QMQ’s terms are definite descriptions. Each identifies and refers to an
individual (a meaning) by describing and identifying a property (being
the meaning of ‘Ex’) whose unique possession identifies the individual.
Whether another such predicate (‘the meaning of “Ey”’) identifies that
referent is an empirical contingency. So extralogical (non-QMQi) QMQ
sentences are contingent empirical copredications.
A definite description is also an indexical rigidly designating the
object in fact identified predicatively.35  So, GmH is both a predicational
identity, GmHp, and a referential identity:
GmHr: The meaning of our word, ‘Greeks’=the meaning of our word,
‘Hellenes’.
Explaining lexically necessary GH as the objectual expression of the
lexically necessary GmHr presents no modal puzzle.
Despite the different modalities, the equivalence
GmHp [itlotu] ≡ GmHr [itlotu] ≡ GH
holds because the indexicals in GmHr codesignate what, as copredicates
in GmHp, they codescribe. Whatever the referent’s properties, GmHr is
necessary if its terms codesignate, so it, along with GH, would be true
even if GmHp had been false. Nevertheless, GmHr and GH are true only
because GmHp is true. The synonymy’s contingency is irrelevant. GmHr
and GmGr are codesignations of the same object, stating the same fact.
Any codesignative identity is necessary if true, and true just in case its
terms codesignate, whether they do so contingently or necessarily. The
necessity of GmGp may explain the necessity of the codesignation in
GmGr, but the necessity of GmGr and GmHr alike derives from the sheer
fact of codesignation.
Unlike GmH, copredicational GmG is necessary. Like GmH, as a sin-
gular predication, GmG is contingent. Any word might mean or have meant
other than it does. Such semantic contingencies are the explanatory con-
tent of their correlative necessities: GmGp, GmGr, GG, and GH, GmHr.
Although the asserted necessities are ‘about’ our world, their truth is a
consequence, not of the facts asserted, but of their linguistic construction.36




1. Sentence ‘p’ and its terms are pivotal in the logical truth of ‘p (pvq)’ and
‘(p&q) p’. These truths are necessitated by the tautological conditional; adding
‘q’ to the consequent and subtracting it from the antecedent do not alter the
explanation of the necessity.
2. The syntactic contrast between synonymous predicates (GH) and coreferring
names (gh) is not essentially epistemic or cognitive: compare the verifications
and informational values of GH and gh. See my “Identity Syntax,” Proceedings
of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Vol. II,  Metaphysics (Bowling
Green, Ohio: Philosophy Documentation Center, 1999), 171–86; and “Identity:
Logic Ontology, Epistemology,” Philosophy 73 (1998): 179–93.
3. Hilary Putnam, “Convention: A Theme in Philosophy,” New Literary History
13 (1981), reprinted in Putnam, Realism and Reason (Cambridge and New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1983), 171.
4. Analyticity is too protean a notion to permit any proof that interception syn-
onymy is an essential assumption. It suffice that the assumption is documentable
for diverse conceptions. Semanticists like Jerrold Katz, intent on distancing them-
selves from Fregean conceptions of analyticity like Putnam’s [1981], retain the
core Fregean commitment to interception synonymy: ‘“Feline animals are fe-
line animals” is a straightforward logical truth . . . what goes for [it] goes for the
synonymous [“Cats are feline animals”]’ (Katz, The Metaphysics of Meaning
[Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990], 218).
5. Consider Quine’s opening salvo against analyticity in “Two Dogmas of Em-
piricism” (Philosophical Review, 60 [1951]: 20). His complaint against defining
analyticity by self-contradictoriness of denial is only that the definition ‘has small
explanatory value’. This concedes that the denial is self-contradictory, which
assumes a synomic sentence is formally a logical sentence. Similarly, Quine
repeatedly dismisses Church’s Translation Test, never for its assuming intercep-
tion synonymy, but for assuming criteria for correct translation. This resort to
radical semantic skepticism is, if not question begging here, drastic and drenched
in ironies since, aside from assuming interception synonymy, the Test turns on
only the use-mention distinction, which Quine proclaims a sine qua nonsense
for logic and semantic theory.
Quine’s critique of analyticity is directed at the explanatory role of synonymy,
not at interception synonymy. (See, “Mind and Verbal Dispositions,” Mind and
Language, ed. Samuel Guttenplan [Oxford: Clarendon, 1975], 83–94.) Once
explanatory delusions are in check, Quine indulges in vulgar talk of synonymies
and definitional truths, and assumes interception synonymy with his tradition.
The point here is only that his semantic skepticism is beside the point here. In
these matters, the Quinean Wittgenstein may be like Quine (see Word and
Object [Cambridge: MIT Press, 1960], n. 26: 79), as may the Kripkean Wittgen-




6. Hilary Putnam, “Synonymity and the Analysis of Belief Sentences,” Analysis 14
(1954): 118. Max Black’s, “The Paradox of Analysis” (Mind 53 [1944]: 263–67) is
our first direct denial of interception synonymy, but confined to identity inter-
ceptions, not logical truths in general.
7. Underlining an expression’s abbreviation (BmB) signals that the expression is
enquoted. The ‘m’ is for ‘means’, taken generically to encompass saying, desig-
nating, expressing, etc.
8. Bold script signals that a German translation of the expression is represented.
9. “Synonymity,” University of California Publications in Philosophy 25 (1950):
201–06.
10. “Intensional Isomorphism and Identity of Belief,” Philosophical Studies 5
(1954): 65–73.
11. “Putnam on Synonymity and Belief,” Analysis 15 (1955): 117–20.
12. This tendency hardened after Saul Kripke’s “A Puzzle About Belief” (Mean-
ing and Use, ed. A. Margalit [Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979], 239–83) turned
Putnam’s insight towards substituting codesignators in attitude contexts.
13. See Scott Soames, “Substitutivity” (On Being and Saying, ed. Judith J. Thomson
[Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987], 99–132), a sustained critique of Putnam [1954]
that proceeds as though the interest and defense of Putnam’s point about inter-
ception syntax lay in its possible resolution of substitutivity puzzles in intensional
contexts.
14. Putnam’s “The Analytic and the Synthetic” (Minnesota Studies in the Philoso-
phy of Science, Vol. 3, ed. H. Feigl and G. Maxwell [Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1962], 358–97) assumes interception synonymy, and some of his
neoessentialism may also.
15. Cf. Alonzo Church, “Intensional Isomorphism and Identity of Belief,” op.
cit.; idem, “Carnap’s Analysis of Statements of Assertion and Belief,” Analysis 10
(1950): 97–99; “The Need for Abstract Entities in Semantic Analysis,” (1951),
reprinted in The Structure of Language, ed. Jerry A. Fodor and Jerrold J. Katz
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1964), 437–45; and Introduction to Math-
ematical Logic (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), 61f. The literature
on the Test is scouted in Nathan Salmon’s “The Very Possibility of Language,”
forthcoming in a festschrift for Church (ed. C. A. Anderson and M. Zeleny).
16. This is implicit in the inspiration for Church’s Test, C. H. Langford’s idea of
using translation as ‘a simple test which helps us to determine whether a word is
being used or talked about’ (Journal of Symbolic Logic 2 [1937]: 53). Langford’s
‘test’ looks backwards since determining whether the word is being used or talked
about may be a precondition of proper translation.
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17. ‘A definition is nothing else but the showing of the meaning of one word by
several other not synonymous terms’ (John Locke, Essay on Human Understand-
ing, II, 4, 6 italics in original).
18. Church [1955] would say that if German has only the one word where English
has two, then GG properly translates GH and GG alike. Only a logician would
deem GG a natural or sensible translation of GH, but Churchians deem this
irrelevant to semantic theory as they conceive it.
Any two interceptions of a logical sentence or its translations that share a
term can be contextually pragmatic equivalents. GG (‘Griechen are Greeks’) and
GH (‘Griechen are Hellenes’) state the same fact as GH, and—unlike GH—when
GH’s truth is understood, both can be used to say that ‘Griechen’ means Greeks,
so they may seem freely interchangeable. But they are not synonymous: they
differ in their semantic relations with GmG, GmH, etc. Their informational equiva-
lence is relative to audience knowledge.
Abstractly, a sentence token has the meaning(s) of its sentence type by its
grammar (syntax and vocabulary). Speech context and speaker’s intention work
with that semantic material to particularize the factual and semantic contents.
The semantic/factual contrast cuts across the sentence type/utterance token
contrast. See my The Significance of Sense (Ithaca: Cornell Press, 1972),
chap. 2.
19. Essentialists fairly presume the propriety of reading essentialist claims
objectually. The Lockean thesis says this reading is only prima facie, for what is
analyzed is not a property, but only our concept of it or the meaning of our term
for it. Quine’s assault on analyticity blurs that contrast. It works against analytical
and referential definitions being purely conventional. It does not warrant wor-
ries whether, as a matter of flat linguistic fact, ‘VP’ really abbreviates—and thus
has exactly the meaning of—‘vice-president’ (as distinct from ‘undetached vice-
presidential parts’, etc.).
20. Even friends of interception nonsynonymy accept its alleged incompatibility
with compositionality. William W. Taschek (“On Ascribing Beliefs: Content in
Context,” The Journal of Philosophy 95 [1998]: 323–53) spoils his sensible criti-
cisms of interception synonymy by casting compositionality as foil.
21. Absent some consensus on a conception of compositionality, its relation to
interception nonsynonymy is moot. See, for example, Paul Horwich, “The Com-
position of Meanings,” The Philosophical Review 106 (1997): 503–32.
22. Perhaps It’s square entails It’s rectangular only because It’s equilateral and
rectangular entails It’s rectangular. However, to suppose the move from Its sides
are equilateral to Its sides are equally long rides on a rule of logic is like suppos-
ing that It’s equilateral and rectangular entails It’s rectangular only by premising
If it’s equilateral and rectangular, it’s rectangular. (See the Section XI infra
argument for the logical truth of QMi.)
The necessity of alter-identities like gh is standardly proven from an axiom
of a self-identity necessity. What explains gh’s necessity is the coreference
of ‘Greece’ and ‘Hellas’, not that Greece (or everything) is identical with
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itself. The basic metalogical modal principle for terms, call it metailment is (where
‘T’ placeholds for any term):
TxmTy ≡ (z)(Txz ≡ Tyz)v (Tx=Ty).
Synonymy entails coextension, whatever the extension happens to be.
23. Every interception (e.g., ‘b=c’) closes two open sentences (‘b=x,’ ‘x=c’),
closed by distinct logical truths (‘b=b,’ ‘c=c’). Grammar does not specify the
constructional story. Perhaps speech context or speaker’s intent sometimes does.
24. See my “How Mathematics Isn’t Logic,” Ratio 12 (1999): 279–95.
25. The arithmetic ‘=’ is a relational predicate. Arithmetic equalities are, gram-
matically, synthetic predications of an objectual relation between mathematical
objects (numbers, quantities). The ‘=’ of logic is not a relational predicate. It is a
syntactic marker of a nonpredicative coidentification, affirming a rigid code-
signating. Sentence meaning is not an arithmetic or algebraic function of word
meanings. See my “How Mathematics Isn’t Logic,” op. cit.; idem, “Identity Syn-
tax,” op. cit., and idem, “Distinguishing Mathematics from Logic,” paper presented
at the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Boston, Mass., 10–15 August
1998, http://www.bu.edu/wcp.
26. A less obvious example. GI and gI are sentences about logical form:
GI: Greeks are self-identical: (x)(Gx≡Sx)/(x)(Gx≡Ixx)
gI: Greece is self-identical:  Sg/Igg.
GI says that GG (‘(x)(Gx≡Gx)’) is true because of its own form. gI says the same
about gg (‘g=g’). See my “Identity Syntax,” op. cit., and my “Identity,” op. cit.
27. Try thinking of logical principles as tracking and individuating replicas or
tokens of an extensional symbol (name, predicate, sentence) throughout infer-
ential space.
28. Here ‘E’ is a placeholder for any linguistic expression.
29. Intraquotation synonym subbing is illicit when, as in QM and QMQ, the
quotational referent is the matter—except when, as in QM and QMQ, semantic
properties are predicated of it, for then synonym subbing is truth transmitting.
30. Semantic entailments may be legitimated by facts of language other than
rules of a language. Unlike QMQ correlates of abbreviations such as ET, QMQ
sentences like BmB, GmH, and gmh may state facts of coincidental synonymy,
not a consequence of any rule linking two independent (sets of) rules. Each
expression is understandable without knowledge of the other. For a bilingual,
GmH and GmG are nonsynonymous but essentially alike epistemically. They are
mutual semantic entailments, equivalent synomic interceptions of GmG.
31. Churchfolk reasoning runs wondrously asymmetrical. They say that: (1) B,
Bt, Bt are translated by B, Bt, Bt; (2a) any equivalence of Bt to B and Bt depends
on B’s meaning, and (2b) B and Bt can be understood and known to be true
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without knowing the truth of Bt, so (2c) Bt is logically independent of B and Bt,
so (3) Bt is logically independent of B and Bt. Against this, (4a) Bti holds, what-
ever B’s meaning, and (4b) B and Bt cannot be understood and known without
knowing Bt is true. So too, (5a) Bti (‘Bt ≡ B ≡ Bt’) holds independent of B’s
meaning, and (5b) B and Bt cannot be understood and known without knowing
Bt’s truth. So, contra (3), QTi equivalences like Bti and Bti must be logical
necessities.
The Test goes wrong with its first step, (1). (2) is also problematic. Consider:
you may understand GH (to the degree a monolingual German may understand
Bt) without knowing its truth. If understanding a sentence presupposed under-
standing its constituent terms, then GH could not have its standard use to inform
someone of one of its terms’ meaning. Further, GH may be understood objectually
without knowing whether it is synomic or a synthetic predication, or true. In
contrast, understanding self-identity syntax suffices for knowing that GG is true;
knowing what ‘Greeks’ means is inessential. So too, understanding QMi suffices
for knowing BmB is true, without knowing what ‘Blood is red’ means. So too,
that understanding of QMi, coupled with understanding and knowing the truth
of Bt, suffices for knowing the truth of Bt.
We can insist that you do not understand a sentence unless you know how to
verify it, so if you do not know what ‘alopecia’ means you do not understand
‘Alopecia is glabrousness’. That principle is innocuous if we recognize that know-
ing how to verify includes knowing that, if you do not know what ‘alopecia’
means, you would best ask someone who does know. If you need more know how
than that, if you must already know the identity of a term’s referent or the
properties of its denotation before you can understand a predication or identifi-
cation with the term, the Paradox(es) of Analysis would dissolve, for then analyses
just could not be informative.
32. Church lamented that the “systematic use of quotation marks is open to some
unfortunate . . . misunderstandings,” such as the “not uncommon . . . false im-
pression that trivial or self-evident propositions are expressed” in statements like
BmB and Bti (Introduction to Mathematical Logic, 62 n). He thought that, like
BmB, BmB is “a purely semantical statement about the English language” (“The
Need for Abstract Entities in Semantic Analysis,” 443) that provides ‘an item of
factual information’ (“Carnap’s Analysis,” 98).
33. Strictly, a quotation is not a referring expression, but, like a sentence embed-
ded color patch, an adjunctive element appositional to a definite description or
other referring expression. See my “Quotation Apposition,” The Philosophical
Quarterly 49 (1999): 514–19.
34. Church’s aim of compelling recognition of the reality of propositions is sub-
verted by the Test when Bt is read as referring to a sentence rather than a
proposition.
35. For a defense of this, see Marga Reimer, “Donnellen’s Distinction/Kripke’s
Test,” Analysis 58 (1998): 89–100.
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36. This is a part of a continuing project that owes much to the unflagging
encouragement and bafflement of Bredo Johnsen and David Massie. Various
suspect assumptions scattered through this essay are discussed in works cited
above or in my “Meaning as Explanation,” The Journal of Value Inquiry (forth-
coming), and the transitional “Synonymy Without Analyticity,” International
Philosophical Preprint Exchange  (Nov. 1994).
